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ARTICLE 
FRICTION IN RECONCILING CRIMINAL 
FORFEITURE AND BANKRUPTCY: THE 
CRIMINAL FORFEITURE PART* 
SARAH N. WELLING** & JANE LYLE HORD*** 
INTRODUCTION 
The federal government uses two general types of asset forfeiture, 
criminal and civil.  This Article addresses criminal forfeiture, which 
allows the government to take property from defendants when they are 
convicted of crimes.  It is “an aspect of punishment imposed following 
conviction of a substantive criminal offense.”1 
Criminal forfeiture is a sanction that can be imposed on defendants 
only after they are convicted of an authorizing substantive crime.  Thus, 
criminal forfeiture is basically another part of the sentence rather than a 
separate charge in itself.2  And forfeiture is a jury decision: if the 
defendant is convicted on the underlying crime or crimes, the forfeiture 
count is then submitted to the jury.3  The jury must make predicate 
factual findings in order to impose forfeiture.  If the jury decides to 
impose forfeiture, the judge has no discretion to overrule the jury. 
* Presented by Sarah N. Welling at: A Cross-Disciplinary Dialogue: White Collar Crime, 
Asset Forfeiture and Business Bankruptcy (Conference at the Golden Gate University School of 
Law, San Francisco, November 4-5, 2011). 
** Ashland-Spears Distinguished Research Professor, College of Law, University of 
Kentucky. 
*** J.D. Candidate, May 2012, College of Law, University of Kentucky; KENTUCKY LAW 
JOURNAL, Volume 100, Special Features Editor. 
 1 Libretti v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 356, 363 (1995). 
 2 See id. at 364. 
 3 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.2(b)(5)(B). 
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Criminal forfeiture has a short history.  Between 1790 and 1970 it 
was authorized by Congress only once.4  In 1970, Congress revived 
criminal forfeiture for convictions of the most serious drug crime, the 
Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE), and under the Racketeering 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).5  In 1984, forfeiture 
was expanded to apply to all drug felonies,6 and in 1986, Congress 
enacted a third criminal forfeiture statute that applied to money 
laundering crimes.7  Over the years, Congress has amended the money 
laundering forfeiture statute to include so many other crimes that it is 
now more accurately characterized as a general criminal forfeiture 
statute. 
Thus, the law of criminal forfeiture is established by three main 
statutes:8 the drug forfeiture statute,9 the RICO forfeiture statute,10 and 
the general criminal forfeiture statute.11  These three forfeiture statutes 
are very similar.  The drug forfeiture statute and the RICO forfeiture 
statute were adopted together in 1970 and are identical in many ways.  
Accordingly, courts often find authority under one persuasive for the 
other.12  The general criminal forfeiture statute, enacted later, adopts by 
 4 United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485, 1487 (10th Cir. 1988) (between 1790 and 1970, 
riminal
 2012). 
st, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 2253 (Westlaw 2012) (criminal 
rfeitur
 also 21 U.S.C.A. § 970 (Westlaw 2012). 
, so any 
12). 
6 F.3d 948, 950 (1st Cir. 1997) (noting that drug and 
ICO 
c  forfeiture was authorized only once to recover life estates of Confederate soldiers). 
 5 See 21 U.S.C.A. § 848 (Westlaw 2012); see also 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-64 (Westlaw
 6 See 21 U.S.C.A. § 853(a) (Westlaw 2012). 
 7 18 U.S.C.A. § 982 (Westlaw 2012). 
 8 Other criminal forfeiture statutes exi
fo e authorized for crimes of sexual exploitation and other abuse of children involving visual 
depictions under 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2251-2252A, 2260 (Westlaw 2012)) and 18 U.S.C.A. § 1467 
(Westlaw 2012) (criminal forfeiture authorized for violations of 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1460 et seq. 
(Westlaw 2012) (involving obscene materials)). 
 9 21 U.S.C.A. § 853 (Westlaw 2012); see
 10 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963 (Westlaw 2012).  RICO does not authorize civil forfeiture
RICO forfeiture is necessarily criminal. 
 11 18 U.S.C.A. § 982 (Westlaw 20
 12 See, e.g., United States v. White, 11
R forfeiture statutes should be interpreted “in pari passu”); United States v. McHan, 101 F.3d 
1027, 1042 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2468 (1997) (showing by way of legislative 
history that Congress intended the statutory definitions of proceeds to be interpreted the same under 
the money laundering and drug and RICO forfeiture statutes); United States v. Shifflett, Nos. 93-
5693, 93-5721, 93-5742, 93-5787, 94-1417, 94-5069, 94-5287, 1995 WL 125506, at *3 (4th Cir. 
Mar. 23, 1995) (stating that legislative history shows Congress intended RICO and drug forfeiture 
statutes to be relevant to each other); United States v. Ripinsky, 20 F.3d 359, 362 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(referring to cases and legislative history discussing RICO and drug forfeiture statutes 
interchangeably); United States v. Libretti, 38 F.3d 523, 528 n.6 (10th Cir. 1994), aff’d sub nom. 
Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29 (1995) (noting that cases construing the RICO forfeiture 
statute may be used in applying the drug forfeiture statute due to the similarity of the statutory 
language); United States v. Bissell, 866 F.2d 1343, 1349 n.3 (11th Cir. 1989) (same). 
2
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reference most of the drug forfeiture statute.13  These three statutes are 
discussed together below. 
Up until the year 2000 or so, the government used criminal 
forfeiture less frequently than civil forfeiture because civil forfeiture was 
easier for the government.  In civil forfeiture actions, among other 
advantages, the government’s burden of proof was lower, the burden 
shifted off the government to claimants, and claimants had no privilege 
against self-incrimination or right to counsel.  As discussed further 
below, in 2000, and again in 2006, criminal forfeiture was expanded 
dramatically, such that the government now uses criminal forfeiture more 
frequently. 
For the government to take property by criminal forfeiture, the 
defendant must be convicted of an authorizing substantive crime, and the 
property the government is seeking must fall within the definition of 
property subject to forfeiture.  These two requirements are discussed in 
Parts I and II below.  Section III then discusses how third-party claimants 
are treated in criminal forfeiture. 
The recent prevalence of large scale white collar crime has created 
tension between forfeiture and bankruptcy law.  Multi-million or 
sometimes billion dollar Ponzi schemes have made names such as 
Madoff and Dreier infamous for the sheer number of victims they 
deceived and the amount of money stolen.  Judge Jed Rakoff best 
described the issue this way: 
An under-appreciated evil of substantial frauds like those of Marc 
Dreier is how they pit their victims against one another.  Where, as 
here, the funds remaining after the fraud is uncovered are insufficient 
to make whole Dreier’s numerous victims and creditors, these 
unfortunates are left to squabble over who should get what.  In this 
case, moreover, resolution of these competing claims involves 
consideration of three bodies of law–criminal law, securities law, and 
bankruptcy law–that cannot always be reconciled without some 
friction.14 
Cases such as Dreier cause a collision between the government’s right to 
forfeitable property with the claims of innocent victims and creditors 
 
 13 18 U.S.C.A. § 982(b)(1) (Westlaw 2012) provides: 
The ny seizure and disposition of the 
 2010). 
 forfeiture of property under this section, including a
property and any related judicial or administrative proceeding, shall be governed by the 
provisions of section 413 (other than subsection (d) of that section) of the Comprehensive 
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (21 U.S.C. 853). 
14 United States v. Dreier, 682 F. Supp. 2d 417, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 
3
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ion to claims victims and creditors 
might assert as third-party claimants. 
I. ED OF A CRIME AUTHORIZING THE 
FORFEITURE SANCTION 
 
when a defendant, and in some cases his or her business, files for 
bankruptcy.  Without some agreement and compromise with the 
government,15 all the forfeitable property of the defendant may be 
removed from the bankruptcy estate.16  This property is only available to 
creditors and victims through asserting a defense available to third 
parties in contesting criminal forfeiture.17  Any attempt by the court to 
intervene in the basic forfeiture process in favor of victims beyond what 
is either provided by the statute or agreed to by the government would be 
considered an abuse of discretion.18  Accordingly, if a third party does not 
have a viable defense to forfeiture, the victim is left at the mercy of the 
Department of Justice with a petition for remission or mitigation, for 
which the Attorney General has sole and unreviewable discretion to grant 
or deny a request.19  The goal of this Article is to give an overview of the 
forfeiture process, specifically in relat
DEFENDANT IS CONVICT
The substantive crimes that authorize criminal forfeiture are set out 
in the three main forfeiture statutes20 and numerous specific provisions.21  
In addition, in year 2000, Congress adopted a provision that drastically 
increased the number of crimes that authorized criminal forfeiture.22  As 
part of the second major revision of the forfeiture laws in 2006, the 
 
 15 See, e.g., id. at 418 (describing the “Coordination Agreement” between the government 
P), 452 B.R. 391, 411-12 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
. 
17 See United States v. Frykholm, 362 F.3d 413, 415 (7th Cir. 2004). 
ir. 2011) (district court 
res, 28 
.F.R. 
l drug felonies, 21 U.S.C.A. § 853 (Westlaw 2012); RICO interests, 
8 U.S.
 2252 
estl
NAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 1047-48 
est 
and the chapter 11 bankruptcy trustee for Dreier LLP). 
 16 Gowan v. The Patriot Grp. (In re Dreier LL
2011)
 
 18 Compare United States v. Bradley, 644 F.3d 1213, 1305-11 (11th C
appointed receiver to marshal defendants’ assets for fines, forfeiture and restitution; court of appeals 
holds this is abuse of discretion because appointment of receiver is extraordinary equitable remedy, 
and federal and state law provide federal government with adequate remedies based on FDCPA, 28 
U.S.C. §§ 3001 et seq., and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 66 and 69, which are far more 
efficient), with United States v. King, No. 3:06-cr-212-J-33MCR, 2009 WL 4628224, at *1-2 (M.D. 
Fla. Dec. 2, 2009) (recognizing that the government may agree to forgo forfeiture for legitimate 
reasons, such as allowing victims to collect restitution, and approving of such an agreement). 
 19 Regulations Governing the Remission or Mitigation of Civil and Criminal Forfeitu
C § 9.1 (Westlaw 2012). 
 20 The statutes cover al
1 C.A. § 1963 (Westlaw 2012); and general crimes, 18 U.S.C.A. § 982 (Westlaw 2012). 
 21 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 1955 (Westlaw 2012) (gambling business); 18 U.S.C.A. §
(W aw 2012) (child pornography and exploitation). 
 22 NORMAN ABRAMS ET AL., FEDERAL CRIMI
(W Publ’g, 5th ed. 2010); see 28 U.S.C.A. § 2461 (Westlaw 2012). 
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  Following that revision, and its attendant increase 
in forfeiture filings, criminal forfeiture actions outnumbered civil actions 
II.  
After the defendant is convicted of an authorizing crime, the next 
A. 
statutes only in 1970, so it has no common law history.  The statutory 
language defining proceeds varies among the statutes.26  In general, 
 
statute was amended to include a provision that the courts have 
interpreted to expand the crimes authorizing criminal forfeiture to 
include all the crimes that authorize civil forfeiture.23  It now appears that 
the challenge is to identify a crime that does not authorize the sanction of 
criminal forfeiture.24
for the first time.25 
DEFINE PROPERTY SUBJECT TO FORFEITURE 
step is to identify the property subject to forfeiture. 
TWO BASIC CATEGORIES OF FORFEITABLE PROPERTY 
The property subject to forfeiture can be put into two general 
categories.  The first is proceeds of the crime.  The concept of proceeds 
is relatively new to criminal law.  It first appeared in criminal forfeiture 
 
 23 See generally United States v. Vampire Nation, 451 F.3d 189,199-201 (3d Cir. 2006).  The 
statute adopted in 2000 is 28 U.S.C. § 2461.  Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 
106-185, 114 Stat. 202.  It was amended in 2006.  USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization 
Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192 (2006).  The result is that every crime that 
authorizes civil forfeiture also authorizes criminal forfeiture, and the crimes that authorize civil 
forfeiture are many.  See 18 U.S.C.A. § 981 (Westlaw 2012), which adopts the list of crimes in 18 
.S.C.
y 
cheme
erefore, if 
U A. § 1956(c)(7) (Westlaw 2012), which in turn adopts the list of crimes in 18 U.S.C.A. § 
1961(1) (Westlaw 2012). 
 24 One crime that does not authorize forfeiture is 18 U.S.C.A. § 1001 (Westlaw 2012) (false 
statements), which is included under 18 U.S.C.A. § 982 (Westlaw 2012) only for statements 
“involving the sale of assets acquired or held by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation” or “an
s  or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent 
statements, pretenses, representations, or promises.”  18 U.S.C.A. § 982(a)(3)-(4) (Westlaw 2012). 
 25 ABRAMS, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT at 1048 n.21.  Nevertheless, 
civil forfeiture is still used by the government in many situations because the government must only 
prove the defendant’s guilt of a predicate crime by a preponderance of the evidence.  See United 
States v. Liquidators of Eur. Fed. Credit Bank, 630 F.3d 1139, 1150 (9th Cir. 2011).  Th
the government does not have enough evidence to hold the defendant criminally liable for the crime, 
it can still seek civil forfeiture and secure a judgment against any forfeitable property.  Id. 
 26 See 21 U.S.C.A. § 853(a)(1) (Westlaw 2012) (“. . . any property constituting, or derived 
from, any proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of such violation”); 18 
U.S.C.A. § 982(a)(2) (Westlaw 2012) (“any property constituting, or derived from, proceeds the 
person obtained directly or indirectly, as a result of such violation”); 18 U.S.C.A. § 982 (a)(3)(F), 
(a)(5)(E) (Westlaw 2012) (“. . . any property, real or personal, which represents or is traceable to the 
gross receipts obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of such violation”); 18 U.S.C.A. § 
982(a)(6)(A)(ii) (Westlaw 2012) (“any property real or personal . . . that constitutes, or is derived 
from or is traceable to the proceeds obtained directly or indirectly from the commission of the 
5
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however, courts have concluded that proceeds include the gross receipts 
rather than net profits,27 and in 2009, Congress adopted this definition in 
the context of the money laundering crime.28  Additionally, if there are 
multiple defendants, they are held jointly and severally liable for all 
foreseeable proceeds that result from their crime(s).29 
The second general category of property that the government may 
forfeit is property used or involved in the crime.  Again, the statutory 
language varies.30  Based on the historical development of criminal 
forfeiture, in the context of drug crimes, this property is sometimes 
referred to as “facilitating property.”31  Facilitating property has a 
legitimate genesis unconnected to the underlying criminal activity, i.e., it 
was not generated by crime and is not the proceeds of the crime.  But 
when defendants use their clean/untainted property in committing a 
crime, it becomes forfeitable under this second category.  So, for 
example, a defendant who legitimately owns an office building and runs 
an investment company from the building but turns the company into a 
Ponzi scheme may forfeit the building as property that facilitated the 
crime. 
B. MONEY JUDGMENTS 
In addition to forfeiting property that is proceeds of the crime and 
property that facilitated the crime, the government has recently had 
success in the courts when seeking monetary forfeiture judgments in lieu 
of particular pieces of property.32  These money judgments are not 
mentioned in the forfeiture statutes explicitly but are authorized 
 
offense of which the person is convicted”); 18 U.S.C.A. § 982(a)(8)(B) (Westlaw 2012) 
(“constituting, derived from, or traceable to the gross proceeds that the defendant obtained directly 
or indirectly as a result of the offense”). 
 27 See United States v. McHan, 101 F.3d 1027, 1042 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied sub nom. 
cHan
 2012). 
 886, 904 (8th Cir. 2010). 
operty used, or 
ny of the [defendant’s] property used, 
r inte
 643 F.3d 384, 395-98 (5th Cir. 2011). 
M  v. United States, 520 U.S. 1281 (1997). 
 28 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956(c)(9) (Westlaw
 29 See, e.g., United States v. Van Nguyen, 602 F.3d
 30 See 21 U.S.C.A. § 853(a)(2) (Westlaw 2012) (“any of the [defendant’s] pr
intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, such 
violation”); 18 U.S.C.A. § 982(a)(1) (Westlaw 2012) (“. . . any property, real or personal, involved 
in such offense”); 18 U.S.C.A. § 982(a)(6)(A)(ii)(II) (Westlaw 2012) (“any property real or 
personal . . . that is used to facilitate, or is intended to be used to facilitate, the commission of the 
offense”); 18 U.S.C.A. § 982(a)(8)(A) (Westlaw 2012) (“used or intended to be used to commit, to 
facilitate, or to promote the commission of such offense”). 
 31 See 21 U.S.C.A. § 853(a)(2) (Westlaw 2012) (“[A]
o nded to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, such 
violation”) (emphasis added). 
 32 See United States v. Olguin,
6
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 seek money judgments because the government has the 
power to seize substitute property when the specific forfeitable property 
 just another form 
of property. 
has seized him.   The 
gove
feiture, in contrast, the extent of the defendant’s interest in 
the property, if contested, is adjudicated at the stage called an ancillary 
 
 
implicitly by the government’s power to seize substitute property.  This 
power is described in more detail below.  The theory is that the 
government may
is unavailable for one reason or another, and money is
C.   DEFENDANT HAS AN INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY 
In order to forfeit any property, the government must prove that the 
defendant had an interest in that property.  The reason is that criminal 
forfeiture is considered an in personam action against the defendant, over 
whom the government has jurisdiction because it 33
rnment therefore has power over all the property the defendant has 
an interest in.  If the defendant has no interest in the property, the 
government has no jurisdiction over the property. 
This theoretical foundation of criminal forfeiture can be contrasted 
with civil forfeiture actions.  Civil forfeiture actions are in rem actions 
against the property itself.34  These cases have names like United States 
v. $6,976,934.65, Plus Interest Deposited into Royal Bank of Scotland 
International, Account No. 2029-56141070, Held in the Name of 
Soulbury Ltd., and Property Traceable Thereto.35  In these actions, the 
government is bringing a civil action against the property directly, 
seeking to adjudicate all persons’ rights in the property, and the 
government’s jurisdiction is based on its seizure of the property.  In 
criminal for
 33 See United States v. Liquidators of Eur. Fed. Credit Bank, 630 F.3d 1139, 1149 (9th Cir. 
011). 
, Cayman Islands, British West Indies, on or about March 17, 1995, 513 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 
008). 
2
 34 Id. 
 35 United States v. Soulberry Limited, 554 F.3d 123 (D.C. Cir. 2009); see also United States 
v. Approximately $1.67 Million (US) in Cash, Stock, and Other Valuable Assets Held by or at: 1) 
Total Aviation Ltd., Account No. 7092686, Located at Barclays Bank PLC, Grand Cayman, Cayman 
Islands, British West Indies; 2) Deacon Barclays De Zoete Wedd Limited, Account No. 13603A-2 
aka Barclays Private Bank & Trust CM1633, Located at Barclays Private Bank & Trust (Cayman) 
Limited, Grand Cayman, Cayman Islands, British West Indies; 3) Total Financial Consultants Ltd., 
Account Reference 310205-633500, Located at the Barclays Private Bank & Trust (Cayman) 
Limited, Grand Cayman, Cayman Islands, British West Indies; 4) Cashiers Check 11405244-152 in 
the Amount of $85,000 (US), Drawn at the Royal Bank of Canada, Georgetown, Grand Cayman, 
Cayman Islands, British West Indies, on or about March 20, 1995; and 5) Cashiers Check 11405244-
141 in the Amount of $21,250 (US) Drawn at the Royal Bank of Canada, Georgetown, Grand 
Cayman
2
7
Welling and Hord: Criminal Forfeiture
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2012
558 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
and 
sentenced. 
the 
crime need be established.  So, if the government is seeking forfeiture on 
s, 
or substantial connection, exist between the crime and the property.  
rime.  
Beca
 
proceeding,36 which is held after the defendant is convicted 
D.   A “NEXUS” EXISTS BETWEEN THE CRIME AND THE PROPERTY 
In order for property to be deemed subject to forfeiture, there must 
be what the courts call a “nexus” between the property and the crime.37  
This nexus requirement was developed by the courts based on the 
conclusion that it is implicit in the statutory language.  Generally, this 
requirement is only significant when property is forfeited under the 
theory that it facilitated the crime.  In contrast, if the property is forfeited 
under the theory that it is proceeds, inevitably a nexus exists: the 
property was by definition generated by the crime.  Furthermore, if the 
government is seeking a money judgment, the theory is that this is 
substitute property, and no nexus between substitute property and 
the basis that property facilitated a crime, the courts require that a nexu
38
E.   TITLE TO THE PROPERTY AND THE “RELATION BACK” DOCTRINE 
The forfeiture statutes all provide that “[a]ll right, title, and interest 
in [forfeitable] property . . . vests in the United States upon the 
commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture . . . .”39  This legal fiction, 
called the “relation back” doctrine, means that the title to forfeitable 
property vests in the federal government at the time the crime is 
committed or at the time the property is used to facilitate the c
use title vests in the government at the time of the crime, anything 
that is done to the property after that by the defendant or a third party 
does not change its character—it is still the government’s property. 
The effect of the relation back provision varies depending on which 
theory of forfeiture the government uses.  For proceeds, the relation back 
doctrine means that proceeds were never the property of the criminal 
defendant, because at their creation, i.e., when the defendant generated 
them through the crime, title vested in the government.  The defendant 
 
 36 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.2(c); see also WRIGHT & WELLING, 3 FED. PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE § 573 (4th ed.). 
 37 See, e.g., United States v. Hull, 606 F.3d 524, 527-29 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Van 
guye
, 527-29 (8th Cir. 2010). 
N n, 602 F.3d 886, 903 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that the defendant’s home had a sufficient nexus 
to support forfeiture but his BMW did not). 
 38 United States v. Hull, 606 F.3d 524
 39 21 U.S.C.A. § 853(c) (Westlaw 2012). 
8
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eans that title shifts from the defendant to 
the government.  Facilitating property legitimately belonged to the 
k doctrine 
legally shifts the title from the defendant to the government when the 
prop
IZE SUBSTITUTE PROPERTY 
the 
exac  to forfeiture is unavailable due to actions by the 
defendant.  T
(1) [
of th
(C) has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court; 
) has been substantially diminished in value; or 
Cong
iminal defendants receive the mandatory 
forfeiture sanction Congress intended and disgorge their ill-gotten gains, 
 
 
never has any claim of title.  For property that facilitated the crime, on 
the other hand, relation back m
defendant up until the time of the crime, and the relation bac
erty is used in the crime. 
F.   GOVERNMENT POWER TO SE
The government is authorized to seize substitute property if 
t property subject
he statutes provide: 
I]f any [forfeitable] property . . . as a result of any act or omission 
e defendant— 
(A) cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence; 
(B) has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a third 
party; 
(D
(E) has been commingled with other property which cannot be 
divided without difficulty 
 
. . . . 
 
the court shall order the forfeiture of any other property of the 
defendant . . . .40 
ress’s rationale for giving the government this power to seize 
substitute property is to ensure that defendants cannot evade the 
forfeiture.  Seizure of substitute assets is meant to deprive the defendant 
of all forfeitable assets or the value thereof. 
The substitute property power is the justification for the allowance 
of monetary judgments.41  By allowing monetary judgments, the courts 
intend to effectuate the broad remedial purpose of the forfeiture acts42 
and “ensur[e] that all eligible cr
 40 21 U.S.C.A. § 853(p) (Westlaw 2012). 
 41 See United States v. Olguin, 643 F.3d 384, 395-98 (5th Cir. 2011) (including a list of other 
onetary judgments). cases approving of m
 42 Id. at 397. 
9
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even
, sold the asset and it is untraceable, the 
gove
able money.   Even if there is 
not enough truly forfeitable money left to satisfy the forfeiture judgment, 
ets from third parties under the 
forfeiture laws to satisfy the judgment.50 
, creates real problems for third parties.  As the defendant no 
 
 
 those already spent.”43  With this purpose in mind, all circuits to 
which the issue of monetary judgments has been presented have 
approved of their imposition.44 
The government’s power to seize substitute property is only 
relevant to conflicts between the government and defendant, because the 
doctrine does not authorize the government to forfeit substitute property 
held by third parties.  The provision allowing seizure of substitute 
property applies only to the defendant’s property.45  The government can 
take specific transferred assets out of the hands of a third party, but if 
that party has since, for example
rnment cannot seize substitute property under the forfeiture laws.  
Rather, it must resort to state common law actions of conversion and 
detinue to recover the money.46 
Unless the third party can establish either of the two statutory 
defenses available to third parties (noted below),47 because substitute 
property cannot be seized from third parties,48 the court must determine 
exactly how much of the truly forfeitable property is left in the third 
parties’ hands.  If the forfeitable property is money that has been 
commingled with other funds, and there has been an outflow of funds 
from the commingled account, the court must determine if the outflow 
came from the clean funds or the forfeit 49
the government cannot seize substitute ass
III. FOLD IN THIRD-PARTY CLAIMANTS 
The legal fiction created by the relation back doctrine, i.e., that title 
to forfeitable property vests in the government at the moment it becomes 
forfeitable
 43 United States v. Casey, 444 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 44 See Olguin, 643 F.3d at 397. 
 45 United States v. Moffitt, Zwerling & Kemler, P.C., 83 F.3d 660, 668 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. 
enied
w attorneys for a large scale drug dealer took drug proceeds as fees 
ms. 
(1st Cir. 2003). 
d , 117 S. Ct. 788 (1997). 
 46 See id. (describing ho
and the government pursued the law firm when it was unable to obtain a sufficient return from the 
convicted defendants; by the time the government tried to obtain a forfeiture order against the firm, 
it had allegedly already spent the money out of its general fund, and the government could only 
pursue the firm through state common law tort actions). 
 47 See infra Part III, which details third-party clai
 48 Moffitt, Zwerling & Kemler, P.C., 83 F.3d at 668. 
 49 United States v. Saccoccia, 354 F.3d 9, 13-14 n.49 
 50 See, e.g., id.; Moffitt, Zwerling & Kemler, P.C., 83 F.3d at 668. 
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long
The forfeiture statutes specify the interaction between the relation 
back ute 
prov
c  property that is subsequently transferred to a 
nds of 
third
vernment such that the defendant does not have good title 
to the property, can the defendant transfer good title to third parties, or 
 the 
government?54 
ides third-party claimants with two possible 
defenses. The first, the “superior interest defense,” provides that a 
third the 
prop
 
 
er has good title to any forfeitable property, subsequent transfers to 
third parties do not change its character from that of the government’s 
property. 
 doctrine and the rights of third parties.  Specifically, the stat
ides: 
Third party transfers. All right, title, and interest in [forfeitable] 
property . . . vests in the United States upon the commission of the 
[crime].  Any su h
person other than the defendant . . . shall be . . . forfeited to the United 
States, unless the transferee establishes [one of the two defenses 
discussed below.]51 
Thus, the government can take forfeitable property out of the ha
 parties.52  Combined with the relation back doctrine, this means that 
the defendant cannot hide property from the government by giving it or 
selling it to others.  The statute grants third parties two defenses.53 
At this point, the issue can be articulated in terms familiar to both 
criminal law and bankruptcy as follows: If title to forfeitable property is 
vested in the go
are the defendant’s transfers to third parties void or voidable by
A. TWO STATUTORY “DEFENSES” FOR THIRD-PARTY CLAIMANTS 
Section 853(n) prov
55  
-party claimant may defeat the government’s effort to forfeit 
erty if the third party 
 51 21 U.S.C.A. § 853(c) (Westlaw 2012). 
equently transferred to a person other than the 
law 2012). 
neys lies under section 2-403 of the 
nifor
tes v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, 574 F.3d 329, 330 (6th Cir. 2009) (noting that 
 52 Id. (“Any such property that is subs
defendant may be the subject of a special verdict of forfeiture and thereafter shall be ordered 
forfeited to the United States . . . .”). 
 53 21 U.S.C.A. § 853(n) (West
 54 An analogy familiar to commercial transaction attor
U m Commercial Code, which permits certain good faith purchasers to obtain good title from a 
transferor who held voidable title, but not from a transferor who held no title (e.g., a thief).  U.C.C. § 
2-403 (Westlaw 2012). 
 55 See United Sta
although there is an “innocent owner” defense to civil forfeiture, this defense is not allowed when 
criminal forfeiture is sought); United States v. Soreide, 461 F.3d 1351, 1354 (11th Cir. 2006). 
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invalid in whole or in part 
because the right, title, or interest was vested in the [third party] rather 
e time of the crime, when defendant’s 
inter
ird party must be a 
purchaser for value.  Second, for a mens rea element, the third-party 
ut cause to 
belie bject to forfeiture.”  
B. 
 comes up frequently in the 
cases
 
has a legal right, title, or interest in the property, and such right, title, 
or interest renders the order of forfeiture 
than the defendant or was superior to any right, title, or interest of the 
defendant at the time of the [crime] . . . .56 
This defense is actually a question of timing: the third-party claimant has 
a legal interest in the property, and that interest renders the forfeiture 
invalid because the interest was either (1) vested in the third-party 
claimant rather than the defendant at the time of the crime, or (2) 
superior to the defendant’s interest at the time of the crime.  In plainer 
English, this means that, at th
est shifted to the government, the third party also had an interest in 
the property, and the third party’s interest did not shift to the government 
as the defendant’s interest did. 
The second defense for third parties is called the “bona fide 
purchaser defense.”  Here, the statute provides that a third-party claimant 
can protect his or her property from forfeiture by the government if he or 
she is “a bona fide purchaser for value of the right, title, or interest in the 
property and was at the time of purchase reasonabl[y] without cause to 
believe that the property was subject to forfeiture . . . .”57  This defense 
has two elements.  First, for a conduct element, the th
claimant must be, at time of purchase, “reasonabl[y] witho
ve that the property was su 58
TWO DEFENSES APPLIED TO THE TWO CATEGORIES OF 
FORFEITABLE PROPERTY 
The two third-party defenses work differently when applied to the 
two general categories of forfeitable property.  For the superior interest 
defense, if the government is forfeiting the property based on the theory 
that it was clean property but was used to facilitate the crime, the third 
party will be claiming that, at the time defendant used the property in 
committing a crime, the third party had an interest in it that was vested or 
superior to the defendant’s interest.  This
.  An example is where a defendant husband is convicted of a drug 
 
 56 21 U.S.C.A. § 853(n)(6)(A) (Westlaw 2012). 
 57 21 U.S.C.A. § 853(n)(6)(B) (Westlaw 2012). 
 58 Id. 
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at a third party cannot acquire a superior interest, or that any 
inter
are normally in the form of currency, whereas 
facil
 
 
crime involving his jointly owned house.  In such a circumstance, the co-
tenant / wife’s half interest is not forfeited. 
On the other hand, when the superior interest defense is applied to 
property being forfeited on the theory that it is proceeds of the crime, 
there is some confusion.  By definition, proceeds do not exist until they 
are generated by the defendant committing a crime.  Under the relation 
back doctrine, title to the proceeds vests in the government at the time of 
the crime.  In theory then, the defendant never has any title to the 
proceeds; title is in the government from birth of the proceeds.  Thus, the 
answer to whether the third-party claimant’s title is superior to the 
defendant’s at the time of the crime would seem to be yes, since the 
defendant has no interest in the proceeds, but whether the third party’s 
interest is superior to that of the government is a question not clearly 
addressed by most courts.  The courts that have addressed the issue have 
held either th
est acquired is not superior to that of the government.59  This 
treatment by the courts logically follows from the nature of the superior 
interest defense as a question of timing.  Nevertheless, the confusion in 
this area is merited because rare situations where this logic does not work 
may arise.60 
Now consider the second third-party defense, the bona fide 
purchaser defense, when applied to the different types of forfeitable 
property.  The elements of the defense (purchase for value and mens rea) 
are the same for both proceeds and facilitating property.  Nevertheless, 
because proceeds 
itating property is usually some form of personal property,61 the 
structure of the transactions will be different.  As a result, the nature of 
the elements a third-party claimant must establish will take on a different 
 59 United States v. Martinez, 228 F.3d 587, 590 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Hooper, 229 
.3d 81
 
n the 
crime or 
F 8, 821-22 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Kennedy, 201 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 60 For example, if a husband and wife own a house as co-tenants and a third party has a lien
o house, if the husband sells the lien-holder drugs in exchange for a reduction of the principal of 
the value of the lien, the equity in the house gained by the couple from this transaction would be 
proceeds.  In this situation, the equity created by the crime would be subject to forfeiture at the time 
it was generated, but the wife would still have a superior interest in the house itself that would not be 
subject to forfeiture.  The question would then be what relation the wife’s title in the house would 
have to the government’s title in the forfeitable portion of the couple’s equity in the house. 
 61 While this is not always the case, because the property is used to commit the 
involved in some way, most of the time it is some form of non-monetary real or personal property, 
such as a car used to traffic drugs, a computer used to download child pornography, etc.  Proceeds, 
on the other hand, are the gross receipts of the crime, which is most likely in monetary form, not real 
or personal property. 
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ant had reasonable cause to believe that the property involved 
was 
would 
consider some red-flag events in a transaction enough to impute 
reasonable cause to believe to a third-party claimant in an arm’s length 
transaction.  For example, a large purchase, such as an expensive car or 
 
tone depending on whether the forfeitable property is proceeds or used or 
involved property. 
Facilitating property can, by its very nature, lead to a reasonable 
suspicion that it is subject to forfeiture.  While this may not be true of a 
house or computer, some property by its mere possession or condition 
should raise some apprehension on the part of a third-party buyer.  For 
example, a car that has hidden compartments would lead a reasonable 
person to believe that it was used to hide and transport something illegal.  
Additionally, the defendant is likely to be the seller in the transaction.  
Unless the third-party claimant is an institution with a lien against the 
property or a pawn shop, the defendant will usually be engaging in a 
transaction with an individual in a non-traditional commercial context.  
Therefore, the third-party claimant will likely have more personal 
interaction with the defendant than in other arm’s length commercial 
transactions and can analyze the circumstances of the one-on-one 
transaction more carefully.  This allows a court to more easily infer that 
the claim
forfeitable.  Also, as the defendant will tend to be the seller, the 
substance of the transaction may be questionable.  A defendant looking 
to get rid of the property linked to the crime may sell the property for a 
price well under its obvious value.  This would call into question the 
value given by the third party and, if clearly inadequate consideration, 
the transaction may not be considered a bona fide purchase by the 
court.62 
With regard to proceeds, the defendant is more likely to be a buyer 
in a traditional commercial setting.  The structure of the transaction and 
position of the parties makes it less likely that a third party will be 
imputed with reasonable cause to believe that the money involved in the 
transaction would be subject to forfeiture.  Unless the third-party 
claimant has some personal relationship with the defendant that would 
give the claimant reason to believe that the defendant was involved in 
some illegal activity, it is more likely that the claimant can establish the 
requisite mens rea.  Nevertheless, it is possible that a court 
 
 62 Again, Uniform Commercial Code section 2-403(2) provides an analogy, under which 
greater protections are accorded to buyers who purchase from merchants in the business of selling 
oods g of the kind, provided that the sale was “in the ordinary course of business.”  U.C.C. § 2-
403(2) (Westlaw 2012). 
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ly, 
 to be the buyer in the transaction, 
the issue of adequate consideration is not likely to be an issue, meaning 
that 
ent forfeits property based on a theory that it facilitated the 
crim
proceedings between the government and third parties, the interaction 
between the multiple bodies of law that can be at play has caused 
 
house, fully paid for in cash could raise a red flag.63  Additional
because the defendant is more prone
the court will tend not to question the transaction’s substance. 
CONCLUSION: WHO GETS WHAT IN CRIMINAL FORFEITURE, AND THE 
CONFLICT WITH BANKRUPTCY LAW 
The law regarding forfeiture in relation to third-party claimants 
varies depending on the type of property the government is seeking.  
When the government forfeits proceeds, third-party claimants have good 
title against the government if they establish the two elements of the 
bona fide purchaser defense: they gave value and reasonably lacked 
cause to believe the property was subject to forfeiture.  When the 
governm
e, third-party claimants have good title against the government if (1) 
they establish the two elements of the bona fide purchaser defense, or (2) 
they can show that their interest in the property was superior to the 
defendant’s interest at the time the property was used in committing a 
crime. 
Unlike bankruptcy law, with extensive procedures and statutes 
covering how much and in what order claimants collect,64 the criminal 
law on sorting out the property interests among third-party claimants has 
received little attention.  Although it is clear that the government’s claim 
of forfeiture takes priority over those of victims and creditors when no 
defense to forfeiture is available,65 the extent to which the government 
can compromise claims and the courts’ ability to pressure the 
government to come to an agreement with the other claiming parties has 
not been addressed.  There is also a lack of guidance when there are 
multiple third-party claimants with interests in the same property.  Most 
forfeiture cases focus on the government’s interest in relation to the 
defendant in the guilt and forfeiture phases of the proceedings.  Although 
there has been an increase in court opinions deriving from ancillary 
 
 63 Cf. United States v. Corchado-Peralta, 318 F.3d 255, 258-60 (1st Cir. 2003) (discussing, in 
the context of money laundering, circumstances that could raise suspicion that the transaction was 
designed to conceal the proceeds of criminal activity). 
 64 See 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 501-11 (Westlaw 2012) (statutes governing the relationship of claims 
and creditors with the bankruptcy estate); 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 726, 943, 1129, 1225, 1325 (Westlaw 
2012) (establishing basic distribution schemes for the various types of domestic bankruptcy cases). 
 65 United States v. Frykholm, 362 F.3d 413, 415 (7th Cir. 2004). 
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 bankruptcy action, the only way to ensure that these 
parties receive some restitution rather than see funds forfeited to the 
government is by agreement between the third parties and the 
government. 
 
confusion for the courts and third-party claimants trying to recover stolen 
or owed funds.66  The forfeiture process does allow recourse for victims 
in limited situations, as discussed above.  Nevertheless, in cases with 
dozens of victims and creditors, especially when there is an 
accompanying
 66 See, for example, United States v. Frykholm, where the court opines that the government 
could have filed an involuntary bankruptcy action against the defendant to solve the problems 
created by the competing claims.  Id. at 417.  In a Ponzi scheme such as Frykholm, however, there 
are likely to be dozens of creditors.  No single creditor, including the government, can initiate an 
involuntary bankruptcy where there are more than twelve creditors.  See 11 U.S.C.A. § 303(b)(2) 
(Westlaw 2012).  Nevertheless, the government may have the ability to appoint a receiver, who has 
the power to initiate a bankruptcy case on the defendant debtor’s behalf. 
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